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Abstract 
 
Purpose – the purpose of this paper is to provide a general review of One Belt One Road 
initiative, the changing attitude of Europe towards China’s FDI and potential effects of recently 
adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 
establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. 
Design/methodology/approach – this analysis is based on material gathered from academic 
papers and other publications, media reports, as well as data from official sources and independent 
research centres. Systematic analysis, generalisation, secondary data analysis, as well as linguistic 
methods were used in this research paper. 
Finding – as Peoples’ Republic of China (China) became one of the most important trade and 
investment partners of the EU, its rapid growth in economic and political influence and use of 
development policies, such as OBOR initiative, made the EU to label China as ‘economic competitor’ 
and ‘strategic rival’. As around half of the EU members do not have investment screening mechanisms, 
the EU decided to adopt regulation for this matter – the Framework Regulation. It will become 
applicable from 11 October 2020 and will allow the EU and its Member States to raise concerns about 
effect of China’s FDI on national security and public policy grounds and provides framework for 
screening of FDIs. Moreover, as the Framework Regulation establishes the list of projects of Union 
interest, which includes Trans-European Networks for Transport, whereas OBOR initiative is aiming at 
connecting China and Europe through land and sea route infrastructure, the European Commission 
will have an instrument to express its opinion regarding Chinese FDI, which are connected to OBOR 
initiative and related to transport infrastructure. Although such opinion will not binding, the member 
state will not be able to simply ignore but will have to provide explanation to the Commission if its 
opinion was not followed. 
Research limitations/implications – there are several research limitations: firstly, there is a 
lack of comprehensive information on implementation of OBOR initiative, as even the official webpage 
of Belt and Road does not provide such information; secondly the Framework Regulation will become 
applicable from 11 October 2020. As the latest data indicates a substantial decrease of China’s 
investment in EU (in 2017 and 2018), the flows of China’s capital under OBOR initiative in general and 
FDI in particular might further decline before the Framework Regulation comes into force in 2020. 
Furthermore, without the actual practice of the Commission or EU Member States in the use of 
Framework Regulation regarding the China’s FDI, this analysis serves as an early and theoretical 
assessment of potential impact of such investment screening on projects under China’s OBOR 
initiative. Finally, this general review paper does not seek to analyse problematic aspects of the 
Framework Regulation or procedural issues on implementation of screening mechanisms. 
Practical implications – as the OBOR initiative is broad in scope and vague in terms, this 
analysis allows to better understand its contents, China’s rising importance in field of EU FDIs and 
provides introduction into the Framework Regulation, indicating its potential use by the EU or 
member states in regards to China’s FDI related to OBOR initiative. 
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Originality/Value – this analysis provides explanation on changing EU-China economic policy 
and serves as a sound starting point for further research on China’s investments in Europe, OBOR 
initiative or the impact of Framework Regulation to China’s FDI. 
Keywords: China, EU, OBOR, BRI, FDI, investment screening, Regulation 2019/452. 
Research type: general review.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The story of China’s economic development from Great Chinese Famine in 1959-61 to 
second biggest economy of the world is miraculous. But China is not the first economic 
miracle of Asia, as modern Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea or Taiwan are early 
examples of developmental state. This economic rise of China was based continuous and 
successful economic policies: from Opening of China started by Deng Xiaoping in December 
1978, to China’s accession to WTO in 2001 and ‘Going Out’ strategy of 2000, which seek 
promote national champions and to create sophisticated, high value-added, brand-name 
Chinese companies with their own intellectual property, as well as internally restructure low-
end industry (Bambalas, 2017 ). China’s newest policy concerning the further development of 
its economy is One Belt One Road (OBOR, in Chinese Yi Dai Yi Lu) initiative (BRI), which was 
announced in 2013 and aims to connect China and Europe via land route (Belt) and sea route 
(Road). 
China is the EU's second-biggest trading partner, whereas the EU is China's biggest 
trading partner (Eurostat data, 2019). And although China and the EU have deep economic 
interdependence, the changing attitude of the EU towards inflows of capital from China and 
about China’s role in the global system, led not only to a dramatic political shift in attitudes 
towards China, but also to a regulatory change: the introduction of new investment screening 
regime, which raises questions about its effects on execution of OBOR initiative in the EU. 
This article seeks to provide a general review of BRI, changing attitude of Europe 
towards China and China’s investments and review the recent legislation of the EU: the 
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 
establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union 
(Framework Regulation)1. 
 
The OBOR initiative, its main features and link to the EU 
 
In September 2013 during a speech in Kazakhstan, Xi Jinping, president of China and 
general secretary of the Communist Party of China ofﬁcially announced about the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, which connects China and Europe overland (Verlare, 2016). During a speech at 
the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013, Xi Jinping also announced about the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road, which links Asia, Africa and Europe through sea route (China daily, 2013). 
As major policy changes or foreign policy initiatives are usually announced by the senior 
officials of China’s communist party and the reference to Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road where announced by the highest official of Chinese government 
(general secretary of the Communist Party of China), there was a keen interest on details 
about such policy initiative. 
On 28 March 2015 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, with State Council 
                                                 
1 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a 
framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. OJ L 79I , 21.3.2019 
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authorization adopted a policy document called Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (the OBOR Vision)1. That was the 
first policy document to provide more details on policy initiative announced by Xi Jinping in 
2013 and it consisted of 8 chapters, which elaborated on the purpose, scope, principles, areas 
of interest and financing of such initiative. 
Involvement of National Development and Reform Commission and State Council are 
strong indications of importance of such initiative. The National Development and Reform 
Commission is one of the departments of State Council that is in charge with macroeconomic 
issues, such as formulation and implementation of national economic development strategies, 
and deals with approvals of foreign funded key projects, key investment projects for overseas 
resources development, and investment projects utilizing large amount of foreign exchange 
(NDRC webpage, 2019). Authorization of State Council gives political weight of such initiative, 
as State Council is the highest executive institution (i.e. government) in China2, which under 
Article 89 Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of People’s Republic of China exercises unified 
leadership over the work of the ministries and commissions and directs all other 
administrative work of a national character that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the 
ministries and commissions. Moreover, the fact that the same main points were reiterated in 
13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of The People’s Republic of China3, 
which included BRI as part of China’s ‘All-around opening up’ strategy, indicates the 
importance and relevance of One Belt One Road initiative. 
It is interesting that in one of the first chapters of the OBOR Vision (chapter II), China 
indicates the principles of BRI, in particular five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual 
respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence. These five principles of peaceful coexistence constitute a major pillar of China’s 
foreign policy and were originally enshrined in Panchsheel Treaty4. The principle of non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs is the foundation of China’s foreign policy and is 
still persistently invoked by China, whenever issues related possible human rights or 
international law violations such as: arbitrary detention of an estimated one million Turkic 
Muslims in China’s Xinjiang region (Human Rights Watch, 2019), status of Taiwan, treatment 
of Tibetans (Ren, 2013), development of artificial islands in South China Sea, etc., are invoked. 
The text of the OBOR Vision, which prescribes that ‘it [OBOR initiative] upholds the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, indicates the expectations from China for other 
participants in OBOR initiatives. 
The preface of the OBOR Vision specifies that the purpose of such initiative is to connect 
more closely not only European but also African countries. The chapter ‘Framework’ 
reiterates that OBOR is comprised of The Silk Road Economic Belt which will bring together 
China, Central Asia and Europe (the Baltic) on the one hand, and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, on the other. The Silk Road Economic Belt has become known as the ‘Belt’, whereas 
                                                 
1 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. 
[interactive] 2015-03-28 [accessed 2019-04-20]. 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html>. 
2 Article 85 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [interactive]. [accessed 2019-04-30]. 
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372967.htm> 
3 Chapter 51 of 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of The People’s Republic of China 
(2016-2020). [interactive] [accessed 2019-04-29]. 
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>. 
4 Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (Panchsheel Treaty) (China–
India) (signed at Peking with exchange of notes on 29 April 1954). 299 UNTS 57.  
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21st-Century Maritime Silk Road – as the ‘Road’. Under the OBOR Vision, the scope of Road 
includes New Eurasia Land Bridge and five economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia; 
China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Indochina; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Meanwhile the Road should connect 
China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and 
from China's coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.  
The OBOR Vision indicates 5 cooperation priorities: policy coordination, facilities 
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people ties. Under the 
Vision the facilities connectivity is a priority area which includes construction of transport 
infrastructure, including railways and highways; construction of port infrastructure and 
advanced port cooperation; cooperation in the connectivity of energy infrastructure (oil, gas 
pipelines, power-transmission routes) and construction of cross-border optical cables and 
other communications trunk line networks creating an Information Silk Road.  
On 20 June 2017 a new policy document called ‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under 
the Belt and Road Initiative’ was announced1, which indicated that Road should consist of 
building three ‘blue economic passages’: China-Indian Ocean-Africa- Mediterranean Sea Blue 
Economic Passage; China-Oceania-South Pacific, travelling southward from the South China 
Sea into the Pacific Ocean; and new blue economic passage leading up to Europe via the Arctic 
Ocean. 
 
Figure 1. One Belt One Road (source: merics, 2018)2 
                                                 
1 Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. [interactive] 2015-03-28 [accessed 2019-
04-20]. < https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201706/201706200153032.pdf>. 
2 The Belt and Road initiative map. [interactive] Mercator Institute for China Studies, May 2018 [accessed on 
2019-03-29]. <https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/MERICS_Silk_Road_v8.jpg>. 
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The OBOR Vision also contains provisions concerning establishment of Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and Silk Road Fund, which would act as financing tools for the 
OBOR initiative. On 25 December 2015, the China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) was officially launched, with a legal capital of USD 100 billion1 and focusing on 
regional connectivity and industrial development. AIIB provides funding in forms of loans 
(including loans to states) and equity investment, such as acquisition of shares or loan, that is 
convertible into shares (AIIB Financing operations, 2019). As under the Article 11 of Articles 
of Agreement of AIIB2 this bank can provide or facilitate financing only to members or entities 
and enterprises operating in a member country, considerable amount of countries joined AIIB, 
including some EU members. At the end of April 2019 AIIB had 43 regional member countries 
(excluding Hong Kong) and 26 non-regional member countries, such as Germany, France, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Canada (AIIB members, 2019). The Silk Road Fund was established on 
December 2014 and has a capital of USD 40 billion and RMB 100 billion (Overview: Silk Road 
Fund, 2019). As of beginning of April 2019 Silk Road Fund had signed contracts to provide 
financing for 19 projects (Belt and Road Portal, 2019) and Fund acts as a lender, equity 
investor or investor in sub-funds (Types of investment, 2019). 
Finally, the OBOR Vision also includes a chapter on cooperation mechanisms (Chapter 
V), which provides that China take full advantage of the existing bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation mechanisms to push forward the building of the Belt and Road and to promote 
the development of regional cooperation and encourage signing of cooperation 
Memorandums of Understanding. 
A cooperation format between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 
known as “16+1 Cooperation”, which includes 11 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries 
(with Greece joining this format, it became ‘17+1’) and which convenes in annual summits, 
was founded in 2012 and serves as a platform to promote the OBOR, which is the major 
cooperation priority under the OBOR Vision and essential component of OBOR. The BRI 
projects that were coordinated and concluded through “16+1 Cooperation” mechanism and 
BRI includes Serbia’s E763 Highway project (which is part of European Route E 75), the 
Hungarian section of Budapest-Belgrade Railway and a bridge in Croatia (China-CEEC 
webpage, 2018). The Budapest-Belgrade Railway, which was announced in 2013 meeting of 
the “16+1 Cooperation” in Bucharest was considered to be the first stage of a project that 
would ultimately connect the China-run Piraeus port in Greece with the heart of Europe 
(Shepard, 2017). 
Moreover, China claims that it has signed 171 cooperation documents with 29 
international organizations and 123 countries related to BRI (Zhu, 2019). Although the Belt 
and Road portal does not provide a list of such instruments or of such countries, these 
documents usually are in the form of memorandums of understanding (MoU). They are non-
binding legal instruments, but they serve as a necessary political requirement for China to 
engage into BRI projects with other countries. Moreover, they are used as diplomatic tools 
legitimizing the OBOR, where parties reach an understanding of cooperating on usually the 
five cooperation priorities (Ibold, 2018) prescribed in the OBOR Vision. It should be noted 
that the fact that some MoUs were concluded with countries that are not located near Belt or 
Road (e.g. Nigeria, Senegal or Sierra Leone) demonstrate that OBOR initiative is not limited or 
                                                 
1 Article 4, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement [interactive] [accessed on 2019-04-30] 
<https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-
agreement/basic_document_english-bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf>. 
2 Ibidem. 
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exclusively is directed to Europe and reflects a much broader economic development policy of 
China. Some authors even indicate that OBOR is neither strategy, nor vision, but is a process 
that changes depending on China’s economic development policy goals (Stec, 2018). 
 
Changing attitudes of the EU towards China and its investments: from friends to 
strategic rivals  
 
According to OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index1 EU member states have the 
world’s most open investment regimes for foreign investment (from 0.004 in Luxemburg to 
0.106 in Austria, where 0 is least restrictive and 1 – absolutely restrictive). Whereas, China 
scores 0.251 for the year of 2018, meaning it is much more restrictive than EU. 
Throughout the years, China made a substantial amount of investment in the EU, 
especially as after the global financial crisis of 2008 and European sovereign debt crisis of 
2009-2012, the region was hungry for foreign investments. Although it is difficult to calculate 
the exact aggregate value of China’s foreign direct investment in the EU member states, the EU 
countries are a preferable destination for China’s Foreign direct investment (FDI). According 
to Hanemann and Huotari (2015) from 2000 to 2014 China invested EUR 46.112 billion in EU-
28 member states. A study of Mercator Institute for China Studies (Seaman at all., 2017) notes 
that from 2000 to 2016 the EU-China FDI Monitor dataset recorded more than 1,400 
individual FDI transactions by Chinese investors in the EU worth a combined EUR 101 billion. 
A study by Bloomberg (Tartar at all, 2018) put a total number of China’s European 
investments (including Switzerland), encompassing mergers and acquisitions and green-field 
investments (investments creating a new enterprise or economic activity rather than 
acquiring an existing company) to at least USD 318 billions over the period from 2008 to 
2018, which included the acquisition of around 360 companies. 
Although there are difficulties regarding the measurements of aggregate number China’s 
FDI in the EU, the data on the flows of FDI in EU are more accessible. From 2017 the Chinese 
FDI to EU started to decrease. According to data from Rhodium Group (Hanemann et al, 2019) 
in 2018 Chinese FDI in the EU-28 dropped2. The combined value of completed FDI transactions 
fell to EUR 17.3 billion in 2018, down 40 percent from 2017 levels (EUR 29.1 billion) and a 
drop of over 50 percent from the peak of EUR 37 billion in 2016. However, the share of 
investments from State-owned-enterprises remained high (71% in 2017, 41% in 2018). The 
reasons for such slump originated in China: in 2018, Beijing maintained its tight grip on 
outbound capital flows; it pressured highly leveraged firms to sell off overseas assets; and it 
reduced liquidity in the financial system (Hanneman et al, 2019). Notwithstanding to such 
slowdown of inflow of Chinese FDI, China became one of the biggest investors in the EU.  
Such levels of Chinese FDI and China’s active support of BRI, raised several concerns 
about China’s investments in the EU in particular and in Europe in general. First of all, as 
substantial part of FDI in EU were performed by Chinese State-owned enterprises (71% in 
2017, 41% in 2018), which at very least raised to suspicion that FDI serves China’s policy 
goals instead of purely commercial interests. Secondly, success of Chinese companies in the 
majority of BRI procurements and the lack of transparency in processes through which firms 
are selected to execute BRI projects (Ghossein  at all., 2018), caused concerns that they create 
debt traps for developing countries, leaving them with unsustainable debts. Center for Global 
                                                 
1 OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index [interactive] [accessed on 2019-04-29] 
<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=FDIINDEX#>. 
2 Report indicates, that there were some substantial investments that did not reach the threshold of 10%, e.g. 
Geely’s EUR 7.3 billion acquisition of a 9.7 percent stake in Daimler in February 2018. If such acquisitions had 
been included in calculation the level of China’s investment in EU would be similar to the level in 2017. 
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Development identified Montenegro as one of the countries which could suffer from debt 
distress due to BRI-related financing (Hurley et al, 2018). According to this study 
Montenegro’s big debt problem has one source – a very large infrastructure project, which 
being part of BRI, was financed by China through loan to the government– a motorway linking 
the port of Bar with Serbia, which would integrate the Montenegrin transport network with 
those of other Balkan countries, the cost of which constitutes over 25 percent of GDP. Thirdly, 
interference of some EU member states, which belong to the “16+1 Cooperation” group with 
substantial Chinese investments in the EU’s foreign relations connected to China’s human 
rights record, created concerns about the influence of China and its effect to unity of EU, as 
well as to the erosion of the EU’s fundamental values (such as human rights and rule of law). 
Due to strong opposition of Greece, Hungary, and Croatia the EU did not “support” or 
“welcome” the Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunals decision on the disputes in the South 
China Sea (where it found that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to 
resources within the sea areas falling within ‘nine-dash line’), but merely “acknowledged” it 
(Fallon, 2016). In June 2017 for the first time the EU failed to make an annual statement at the 
U.N. Human Rights Council, criticizing China’s human rights record, because Greece blocked it 
and EU did not have the agreement from all 28 EU member states (Emmott and Koutantou, 
2017). In 2017 Hungary similarly blocked a joint letter on the torture of Chinese human rights 
lawyers and fears started to grow that Italy could begin to act in a similar way following its 
endorsement of the BRI (Marques, 2019). 
The EU tried to accommodate Chinese FDI and BRI, by establishing the EU-China 
Connectivity Platform in 2015, a policy forum between EU and Chinese officials to promote 
synergies between the BRI and EU policies and cooperation on infrastructure, including 
financing, interoperability and logistics (MEMO/16/2258, 2017). In 2018, on the third 
meeting of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, the Short-Term Action Plan was agreed. Under 
this plan the EU and China agreed to strengthen the synergies between China's BRI and the 
EU's Trans-European Transport Network's policy (which includes rail, road, water ways) and 
establish a rolling implementation mechanism and jointly identify the list of pilot projects and 
priority actions, focusing on the key multimodal hubs and missing links on the Trans-
European Network for Transport and the EU-China cargo train routes1. However, although 
China joined the Connectivity Platform, thus accepting an institutional approach with the EU, 
it still prefers a bilateral approach which is based on direct negotiations with individual EU 
member states (Barbieri and Miranda, 2018). As such behaviour created a huge 
embarrassment for the EU on international stage (failure to denounce human right violations) 
and threatened the unity of the block, the EU’s position towards China has shifted2. 
In March 2019 the European Commission announced about a new policy towards 
China3, noting that the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted 
and that China was not only a negotiating partner, but also was an economic competitor in the 
pursuit of technological leadership, as well as a systemic rival, promoting alternative models 
of governance. The European Commission reiterated that such new reality required a flexible 
and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of interests and values. 
Moreover, the Commission indicated that unity of all EU member states is required and 
provided 10 actions points which reflects the roadmap for future EU engagement with China.  
                                                 
1 EU-China Connectivity Platform Short-Term Action Plan [interactive] [accessed on 2019-04-30] 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2018-07-13-eu-china-connectivity-platform-action-
plan.pdf> 
2 It should be noted that those were only few of the reasons for the policy towards China to change. 
3 Joint communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. EU-China – A strategic 
outlook. JOIN(2019) 5 final. 12.3.2019. 
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However, such stark policy change towards China and labelling of China as an ‘economic 
competitor’ or a ‘systemic rival’ were not the only changes, as the EU also  joined several other 
major economies, which had already had instruments related to investment screening on the 
grounds of national security1, by adopting a new legislative instrument – Framework 
Regulation – which provides EU level screening mechanism for FDI from third countries. 
 
Main provisions of the Framework regulation  
 
As foreign direct investment is included in the list of matters falling under the common 
commercial policy pursuant to Article 207(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (‘TFEU’)2, under Article 3(1)(e) of the TFEU, the European Union has exclusive 
competence with respect to the common commercial policy. The EU started considerations on 
common framework for investment screening regime in 2017 and there already were 
concerns about FDI in the EU’s strategic industries, infrastructure and key future technologies 
and the protection of access to them3. As only around half of EU Member States had 
mechanisms for screening foreign direct investments, which varied in scope (review of intra- 
or extra-EU FDI; differing screening thresholds, breadth of sectors covered beyond defense) 
and design (pre-authorisation vs. ex-post screening of FDI) (Grieger, 2018) in place, the 
Commission proposed to solve it through regulation, thus ensuring a single centralized FDI 
screening mechanism.  
On 19 March 2010 the Framework Regulation was adopted, which established a 
framework for the screening by Member States of foreign direct investments into the Union 
on the grounds of security or public order and for a mechanism for cooperation between 
Member States, and between Member States and the Commission, with regard to foreign 
direct investments likely to affect security or public order4. It will become applicable from 11 
October 20205. 
The Framework Regulation provides a broad definition of FDI. Under Article 2(1) of the 
Framework Regulation, FDI means “an investment of any kind by a foreign investor aiming to 
establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the foreign investor and the 
entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to 
carry on an economic activity in a Member State, including investments which enable effective 
participation in the management or control of a company carrying out an economic activity”. 
Such wording does not seem to follow the international investment treaties or free trade 
agreements concluded by EU, but rather follows statistical description of foreign direct 
investment used by Eurostat (Eurostat metadata, 2017). It also should be noted that the 
Recital 9 of the Regulation provides that portfolio investments are not covered, which might 
cause impression that equity investments (investments in shares that do not give controlling 
                                                 
1 In USA The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) reviews transactions involving 
foreign investment in regards to national security under The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act 
of 2018 (FIRRMA); in Canada a national security review process is performed against foreign investment under 
Investment Canada Act; in Australia foreign investor requires approval from the Foreign Investment Review 
Board which involves national security issues under Foreign Acquisition and Takeovers Act; in Japan there is 
post-investment and limited pre-investment reporting system that allows screening of investment on national 
security grounds under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act of 2017. 
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. 
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Welcoming Foreign Direct 
Investment while Protecting Essential Interests. COM(2017) 494 final. 13.9.2017. 
4 Article 1 of the Framework Regulation. 
5 Article 17 of the Framework Regulation. 
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stake) are not covered by Framework Regulation. However, considering the Eurostat 
descriptions of ‘direct investment’, ‘immediate direct investment relationship’ and ‘foreign 
direct investment’ (Eurostat metadata, 2017), portfolio investment should be regarded as 
equity investment (acquisition of shares) that do not reach 10% of the voting power in 
investment enterprise.  
The Framework Regulation does not impose an obligation on Member States to have a 
screening mechanism, but should a member state decide to have one, the Regulation 
establishes certain requirements for such mechanism. They include transparency of rules and 
procedures, non-discrimination among foreign investors, confidentiality of information 
exchanged, the possibility of recourse against screening decisions, and measures to identify 
and prevent circumvention by foreign investors1. 
Although the Framework Regulation is silent on what constitutes security or public 
order and leaves it for each Member State to decide on this issue2, but it does provide a non-
exhaustive list of factors that have to be taken into account while deciding whether foreign 
direct investment is likely to affect security or public order. While determining the effect of 
investment the Member State may consider its potential effects on: critical infrastructure, 
such as energy, transport, water and other; critical technologies and dual use items, supply of 
critical inputs, including energy or raw materials, as well as food security, access to sensitive 
information and freedom and pluralism of the media. Moreover, it should be noted that under 
Article 4(2) the control of the foreign investor (through ownership or financing) and pursuit 
of State-led outward projects or programmes3 should also be taken into account.  
The fundamental part of the Framework Regulation creates an expedient cooperation 
mechanism in relation to FDIs which either undergo screening (Article 6) or do not (Article 7). 
If FDI undergoes screening, then the Member State, conducting the screening, has obligation 
to notify the Commission and other Member states about such screening and provide 
information on such FDI. Such data includes information about the investor and the target 
company, the sectors in which they operate, the value of the investment and its funding, as 
well as the date of its completion4. Member States and Commission can then provide 
comments on whether such FDI is likely to affect its security or public order (the Commission 
provides opinion). When a planned or completed FDI does not or did not undergo screening 
any Member State or Commission may request the Member State of location of such FDI to 
provide information on such FDI (as described above and such Member State is under 
obligation to provide such information) and can provide comments on how such planned or 
completed FDI is likely to affect its security or public order (the Commission provides 
opinion). It should be noted that in any case the Member State performing the investment 
screening or were FDI is planned or has been completed without the screening, is under no 
direct obligation to follow on concerns expressed in comments of opinion of other Member 
States or Commission. However, the Regulation requires such Member State give due 
consideration to such comments or opinion.  
Finally, the Framework Regulation also provides that that the Commission can issue an 
opinion on planned or completed FDI that is likely to affect projects or programmes of Union 
interest on grounds of security or public order. Such projects and programmes are listed in 
Annex to the Framework Regulation and includes Galileo, Copernicus programmes, Horizon 
2020, Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T), Trans-European Networks for 
                                                 
1 Article 2 of the Framework Regulation. 
2 Article 1(2) of the Framework Regulation. 
3 Recital 13 of the Framework Regulation. 
4 Article 9(2) of the Framework Regulation. 
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Energy (TEN-E). In such a case the Member State where the foreign direct investment is 
planned or has been completed cannot simply dismiss the Commission’s opinion, but must 
take utmost account to it and provide an explanation to the Commission if its opinion is not 
followed.   
Although such screening mechanism might not seem sufficient, as the final decision 
making is still left for the Member State where the FDI is planned or has been completed, but 
it provides a mechanism for information sharing with the Commission and other Member 
States and sends a clear message to investors about the factors that are important for 
assessment of FDIs impact on security or public order.  
 
Conclusions: potential impact of the Framework Regulation on OBOR initiative 
projects 
 
The Framework Regulation will have immense regulatory effect on Chinese FDI related 
to OBOR initiative. One of the pillars of the OBOR initiative is construction of land transport 
and sea transport infrastructure, with the aim of creating Belt and Road to Europe. Moreover, 
Chinas SEOs are the usual winners of BRI projects, which are financed mainly by loans from 
China. Furthermore, the EU has labelled China as ‘economic competitor’ and ‘systemic rival’. 
All such factors will be relevant while applying the Framework Regulation: 
1. Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T) is explicitly indicated as project of 
Union interest, which gives to the Commission some leverage regarding screening o FDI’s 
related to OBOR initiative in Member States (e.g. acquisition of equity in port operators) and 
requires such Member States to provide explanation to the Commission if its opinion is not 
followed; 
2. Member State during the screening process and sometimes even when there was no 
screening process at all (if another Member State or Commission provides comments or 
opinion on such FDI under the Framework Regulation) should take into account the potential 
effects of FDI on critical  transport and energy infrastructure;  
3. Equity investments of China’s state-owned enterprises in EU will be scrutinised due 
to their ownership structure and ways of financing and pursuit of state-led outwards projects 
or programmes, especially considering EU’s opinion about China as ‘economic competitor in 
pursuit of technological leadership’; 
4. Framework Regulation will bring transparency to Chinese FDI, as it requires Member 
States to reveal information about the FDI, including information about investor’s ownership 
structure, the sectors in which they operate, the value of the investment and its funding, as 
well as date of its completion. 
However, some caution is warranted, because not all OBOR projects will fall under the 
Framework Regulation, which deals only with FDI. Thus, the Framework Regulation will not 
include BRI projects that are structured through loans to governments and public tenders of 
construction works, as such projects are not considered as FDI. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the Framework Regulation will affect EU 
member states ranking in OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, but the mere existence 
of such screening framework will not necessarily have a big affect on FDI flows from China. EU 
is still an attractive place for China’s FDI. The FDIs from China to EU have started to slow even 
before the Framework Regulation has been adopted and for the reasons related to China’s 
internal policy changes (capital controls, financial system’s liquidity control). Therefore, the 
true impact of the Framework Regulation to China’s FDI flows to the EU in general and FDI 
related to OBOR initiative in particular will become known only after the Framework 
Regulation becomes applicable. Only after we have some practice of the Commission or EU 
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Member States in use of Framework Regulation for the China’s FDI in the EU, we can make 
conclusions on real impact and effect of such new screening mechanism for the Chinese FDI 
related to BRI in the EU. 
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